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Abstract
Prior work has investigated variations of prediction markets that preserve partici-
pants’ (differential) privacy, which formed the basis of useful mechanisms for pur-
chasing data for machine learning objectives. Such markets required potentially
unlimited financial subsidy, however, making them impractical. In this work, we
design an adaptively-growing prediction market with a bounded financial subsidy,
while achieving privacy, incentives to produce accurate predictions, and precision
in the sense that market prices are not heavily impacted by the added privacy-
preserving noise. We briefly discuss how our mechanism can extend to the data-
purchasing setting, and its relationship to traditional learning algorithms.
1 Introduction
In a prediction market, a platform maintains a prediction (usually a probability distribution or an
expectation) of a future random variable such as an election outcome. Participants’ trades of finan-
cial securities tied to this event are translated into updates to the prediction. Prediction markets,
designed to aggregate information from participants, have gained a substantial following in the ma-
chine learning literature. One reason is the overlap in goals (predicting future outcomes) as well as
techniques (convex analysis, Bregman divergences), even at a deep level: the form of market updates
in standard automated market makers have been shown to mimic standard online learning or opti-
mization algorithms in many settings [2, 3, 11, 12]. Beyond this research-level bridge, recent papers
have suggested prediction market mechanisms as a way of crowdsourcing data or algorithms for
machine learning, usually by providing incentives for participants to repeatedly update a centralized
hypothesis or prediction [4, 15].
One recently-proposed mechanism to purchase data or hypotheses from participants is that of Wag-
goner, et al. [15], in which participants submit updates to a centralized market maker, either by
directly altering the hypothesis, or in the form of submitted data; both are interpreted as buying or
selling shares in a market, paying off according to a set of holdout data that is revealed after the close
of the market. The authors then show how to preserve differential privacy for participants, mean-
ing that the content of any individual update is protected, as well as natural accuracy and incentive
guarantees.
One important drawback of Waggoner, et al. [15], however, is the lack of a bounded worst-case loss
guarantee: as the number of participants grows, the possible financial liability of the mechanism
grows without bound. In fact, their mechanism cannot achieve a bounded worst-case loss without
giving up privacy guarantees. Subsequently, Cummings, et al. [8] show that all differentially-private
prediction markets of the form proposed in [15] must suffer from unbounded financial loss in the
worst case. Intuitively, one could interpret this negative result as saying that the randomness of
the mechanism, which must be introduced to preserve privacy, also creates arbitrage opportunities
for participants: by betting against the noise, they collectively expect to make an unbounded profit
from the market maker. Nevertheless, Cummings, et al. leave open the possibility that mechanisms
outside the mold of Waggoner, et al. could achieve both privacy and a bounded worst-case loss.
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In this paper, we give such a mechanism: the first private prediction market framework with a
boundedworst-case loss. When applied to the crowdsourcing problems stated above, this now allows
the mechanism designer to maintain a fixed budget. Our construction and proof proceeds in two
steps.
We first show that by adding a small transaction fee to the mechanism of [15], one can eliminate
financial loss due to arbitrage while maintaining the other desirable properties of the market. The
key idea is that a carefully-chosen transaction fee can make each trader subsidize (in expectation)
any arbitrage that may result from the noise preserving her privacy. Unless prices already match her
beliefs quite closely, however, she still expects to make a profit by paying the fee and participating.
We view this as a positive result both conceptually—it shows that arbitrage opportunities are not
an insurmountable obstacle to private markets—and technically—the designer budget grows very
slowly, only O((log T )2), with the number of participants T .
Nonetheless, this first mechanism is still not completely satisfactory, as the budget is superconstant
in T , and T must be known in advance. This difficulty arises not from arbitrage, but (apparently) a
deeper constraint imposed by privacy that forces the market to be large relative to the participants.
Our second and main result overcomes this final hurdle. We construct a sequence of adaptively-
growing markets that are syntactically similar to the “doubling trick” in online learning. The key
idea is that, in the market from our first result, only about (log T )2 of the T participants can be
informational traders; after this point, additional participants do not cost the designer any more
budget, yet their transaction fees can raise significant funds. So if the end of a stage is reached, the
market activity has actually generated a surplus which subsidizes the initial portion of the next stage
of the market.
2 Setting
In a cost-function based prediction market, there is an observable future outcome Z taking values
in a set Z . The goal is to predict the expectation of a random variable φ : Z → Rd. We assume φ
is a bounded random variable, as otherwise prediction markets with bounded financial loss are not
possible. Participants will buy from the market contracts, each parameterized by a vector r ∈ Rd.
The contract represents a promise for the market to pay the owner r · φ(Z) when Z is observed.
Adopting standard financial terminology, in our model there are d securities j = 1, . . . , d, and the
owner of a share in security j will receive a payoff of φ(Z)j , that is, the jth component of the random
variable. Thus a contract r ∈ Rd contains rj shares of security j and pays off
∑d
j=1 rjφ(Z)j =
r · φ(Z). Note that rj < 0, or “short selling” security j, is allowed.
The market maintains a market state qt ∈ Rd at time t = 0, . . . , T , with q0 = 0. Each trader
t = 1, . . . , T arrives sequentially and purchases a contract dqt ∈ Rd, and the market state is updated
to qt = qt−1 + dqt. In other words, qt =
∑t
s=1 dq
s, the sum of all contracts purchased up to time t.
The price paid by each participant is determined by a convex cost function C : Rd → R. Intuitively,
C maps qt to the total price paid by all agents so far, C(qt). Thus, participant t making trade dqt
when the current state is qt−1 pays C(qt−1 + dqt)− C(qt−1). Notice that the instantaneous prices
pt = ∇C(qt) represent the current price per unit of infinitesimal purchases, with the jth coordinate
representing the current price per share of the jth security.
The prices ∇C(q) are interpreted as predictions of Eφ(Z), as an agent who believes the jth co-
ordinate is too low will purchase shares in it, raising its price, and so on. This can be formalized
through a learning lens: It is known [2] that agents in such a market maximize expected profit by
minimizing an expected Bregman divergence between φ(Z) and∇C(q); of course, it is known that
∇C(q) = Eφ(Z)minimizes risk for any divergence-based loss [1, 6, 13]. (The Bregman divergence
is that corresponding to C∗, the convex conjugate of C.)
Price Sensitivity. The price sensitivity of a cost function C is a measure of how quickly prices
respond to trades, similar to “liquidity” discussed in Abernethy et al. [2, 5] and earlier works. For-
mally, the price sensitivity λ of C is the supremum of the operator norm of the Hessian of C, with
respect to the ℓ1 norm.
1 In other words, if c = ‖q − q′‖1 shares are purchased, then the change in
prices ‖∇C(q)−∇C(q′)‖1 is at most λc.
1For convenience we will assume C is twice differentiable, though this is not necessary.
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Price sensitivity is directly related to the worst-case loss guarantee of the market, as follows. Those
familiar with market scoring rules may recall that with scoring rule S, the loss can be bounded by
(a constant times) the largest possible score. Hence, scaling S by a factor 1λ immediately scales the
loss bound by 1λ as well. Recall that S is defined by a convex function G, the convex conjugate
of C. Scaling S by 1λ is equivalent to scaling G by
1
λ . By standard results in convex analysis,
this is equivalent to transforming C into Cλ(q) =
1
λC (λq), an operation known as the perspective
transform. This in turn scales the price sensitivity by λ by the properties of the Hessian.
Price sensitivity is also related to the total number of trades required to change the prices in a market.
If we assume each trade consists of at most one share in each security, then 1λ trades are necessary
to shift the predictions to an arbitrary point from an arbitrary point.
Convention: normalized, scaled C. In the remainder of the paper, we will suppose that we start
with some convex cost function C1 whose price sensitivity equals 1 and worst-case loss bounded by
some constantB1. Then, to obtain price sensitivity λ, we use the cost functionC(·) = 1λC1(λ·). As
discussed above, C has price sensitivity at most λ and a worst-case loss bound of B = B1/λ. (This
assumption is without loss of generality, as any cost function that guarantees a bounded worst-case
loss can be scaled such that its price sensitivity is 1.)
2.1 Prior work
To achieve differential privacy for trades of a bounded size (which will be assumed), the general
approach is to add random noise to the “true” market state q and publish this noisy state qˆ. The
privacy level thus determines how close qˆ is to q. The distance from ∇C(qˆ) to ∇C(q) is then
controlled by the price sensitivity λ. For a fixed noise and privacy level, a smaller λ leads to small
impact of noise on prices, meaning very good accuracy. However, decreasing λ does not come for
free: the worst-case financial loss of to the market designer scales as 1/λ.
The market of [15] adds controlled and correlated noise over time, in a manner similar to the “contin-
ual observation” technique of differential privacy. This reduces the influence of noise on accuracy to
polylogarithmic in T , the number of participants. Their main result for the prediction market setting
studied here is as follows.
Theorem 1 ([15]). Assuming that all trades satisfy ‖dqt‖1 ≤ 1, the private mechanism is ǫ-
differentially private in the trades dq1, . . . , dqT with respect to the output qˆ1, . . . , qˆT . Further, to
satisfy ‖pt − pˆt‖1 ≤ α for all t, except with probability γ, it suffices for the price sensitivity to be
λ∗ =
α ǫ
4
√
2d⌈logT ⌉ ln(2Td/γ) . (1)
2.2 Our setting and desiderata
This paper builds on the work of Waggoner et al. [15] to overcome the negative results of Cummings
et al. [8]. Here, we formalize our setting and four desirable properties we hope to achieve.
Write a prediction market mechanism as a function M taking inputs ~dq = dq1, . . . , dqT and
outputting a sequence of market states qˆ1, . . . , qˆT . Here qˆt is thought of as a noisy version of
qt =
∑
s≤t dq
s. Each of these states is associated with a prediction pˆt in the set of possible prices
(expectations of φ), while the state qt is associated with the “true” underlying prediction pt.
Definition 1 (Privacy). M satisfies (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy if for all pairs of inputs ~dq, ~dq′ differ-
ing by only a single participants’ entry, and for all sets S of possible outputs, Pr[M( ~dq) ∈ S] ≤
eǫ Pr[M( ~dq′) ∈ S] + δ. If furthermore δ = 0, we sayM is ǫ-differentially private.
Definition 2 (Precision). M has (α, γ) precision if for all ~dq, with probability 1 − γ, we have
‖pˆt − pt‖1 ≤ α for all t.
Definition 3 (Incentives). M has β-incentive to participate if, for all beliefs p = Eφ(Z), if at any
point ‖pˆt − p‖∞ > β, then there exists a participation opportunity that makes a strictly positive
profit in expectation with respect to p.
For the budget guarantee, we must formalize the notion that participants may respond to
the noise introduced by the mechanism. Following Cummings et al. [8], let a trader
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strategy ~s = (s1, . . . , sT ) where each st is a possibly-randomized function of the form
st(dq1, . . . , dqt−1; qˆ1, . . . , qˆt−1) = dqt, i.e. a strategy taking the entire history prior to t and out-
putting a trade dqt. Let L(M,~s, z) be a random variable denoting the financial loss of the market
M against trader strategy ~s when Z = z, which for the mechanism described above is simply
L(M,~s, z) =
T∑
t=1
[
C(qˆt)− C(qˆt + dqt)− dqt · φ(z)] .
Definition 4. M guarantees designer budgetB if, for any trader strategy ~s and all z, EL(M,~s, z) ≤
B, where the expectation is over the randomness inM and each st.
3 Slowly-Growing Budget
The private market of Waggoner et al. [15] causes unbounded loss for the market maker in two ways.
The first is from traders betting against the random noise introduced to protect privacy. This is a key
idea leveraged by Cummings et al. [8] to show negative results for private markets. In this section,
we show that a transaction fee can be chosen to exactly balance the expected profit from this type
of arbitrage.2 We will show that this fee is still small enough to allow for very accurate prices.3
This transaction fee restores the worst-case loss guarantee to the inverse of the price sensitivity, just
as in a non-private market. The second way the market causes unbounded loss is to require price
sensitivity to shrink as a function of T ; this is addressed in the next section.
We show that with this carefully-chosen fee, the market still achieves precision, incentive, and pri-
vacy guarantees, but now with a worst-case market maker loss of O((log T )2), much improved over
the naïve O(T ) bound. This is viewed as a positive result because the worst-case loss is growing
quite slowly in the total number of participants, and moreover matches the fundamental “informa-
tional” worst-case loss one expects with price sensitivity λ∗.
3.1 Mechanism and result
Here we recall the private market mechanism of [15], adapted to the prediction market setting fol-
lowing [8]. We will express the randomness of the mechanism in terms of a “noise trader” for both
intuition and technical convenience. The market is defined by a cost function C with price sensi-
tivity λ, and parameters c (transaction fee), ǫ (privacy), α, γ (precision), and T (maximum number
of participants). There is a special trader we call the noise trader who is controlled by the designer.
All actions of the noise trader are hidden and known only by the designer. The designer publishes
an initial market state q0 = qˆ0 = 0. Let T ′ denote the actual number of arrivals, with T ′ ≤ T by
assumption. Then, for t = 1, . . . , T ′:
1. Participant t arrives, pays a fee of c, and purchases bundle dqt with ‖dqt‖1 ≤ 1. The
payment is C(qˆt + dqt)− C(qˆt).
2. The noise trader purchases a randomly-chosen bundle zt, called a noise trade, after selling
off some subset {zt1, . . . , ztk} of previously purchased noise trades for ti < t, according
to a predetermined schedule described below. Letting wt = zt −∑ki=1 zti denote this net
noise bundle, the noise trader is thus charged C(qˆt + dqt + wt)− C(qˆt + dqt).
3. The “true” market state is updated to qt = qt−1 + dqt, but is not revealed.
4. The noisy market state is updated to qˆt = qˆt−1 + dqt + wt and is published.
Finally, z ∈ Z is observed and each participant t receives a payment dqt · φ(z). For the sake of
budget analysis, we suppose that at the close of the market, the noise trader sells back all of her
remaining bundles; letting wT
′
be the sum of these bundles, she is chargedC(qˆT
′ −wT ′)−C(qˆT ′).
Noise trades. Each zt is a d-dimensional vector with each coordinate drawn from an independent
Laplace distribution with parameter b = 2⌈logT ⌉/ǫ. To determine which bundles zs are sold at
time t, write t = 2jm where m is odd, and sell all bundles zs purchased during the previous
2Intuitively, it is enough for the fee to cover arbitrage amounts in expectation, because a trader must pay the
fee to trade before the random noise is drawn and any arbitrage opportunity is revealed.
3For instance, if the current price of a security is 0.49 and a trader believes the true price should be 0.50,
she will purchase a share if the fee is c < 0.01. (For privacy, we limit each trade to a fixed size, say, one share.)
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2j−1 time steps which are not yet sold. Thus, the noise trader will sell bundles purchased at times
s = t−1, t−2, t−4, t−8, . . . , t−2j−1; in particular, when t is odd we have j = 0, so no previous
bundles will be sold.
Budget. The total loss of the market designer can now be written as the sum of three terms: the loss
of the market maker, the loss of the noise trader, and the gain from transaction fees. By convention,
the noise trader eventually sells back all bundles it purchases and is left with no shares remaining.
L(M,~s, z) =
net loss of market maker︷ ︸︸ ︷
T ′∑
t=1
C(qˆt−1)− C(qˆt−1+ dqt) + dqt · φ(z)+
net loss of noise trader︷ ︸︸ ︷
T ′∑
t=1
C(qˆt−1+ dqt)− C(qˆt) +
fees︷︸︸︷
cT ′. (2)
The main result of this section is as follows.
Theorem 2. When each arriving participant pays a transaction fee c = α, the private market with
any λ ≤ λ∗ from eq. (1) satisfies ǫ-differential privacy, (α, γ)-precision, 2α-incentive to trade, and
budget bound B1λ , where B1 is the budget bound of the underlying cost function C1.
3.2 Proof ideas: privacy, precision, incentives
The differential privacy and precision claims follow directly from the prior results, as nothing has
changed to impact them. The incentive claim is not technically involved, but perhaps subtle: the
transaction fee should be high enough to eliminate expected profit from arbitrage, yet low enough
to allow for profit from information. The key point is that the transaction fee is a constant, but the
farther the prices are from the trader’s belief, the more money she expects to make from a constant-
sized trade. The transaction fee creates a ball of size 2α around the current prices where, if one’s
belief lies in that ball, then participation is not profitable.
We give most of the proof of the designer budget bound, with some claims deferred to the full
version.
Lemma 1 (Budget bound). The transaction-fee private market with any price sensitivity λ ≤ λ∗
guarantees a designer budget bound of B1λ .
Proof. Let c be the transaction fee; we will later take c = α. Then the worst-case loss from eq. (2)
is
WC(λ, T ′) :=WC0(λ, T ′) +NTL(λ, T ′)− T ′c ,
where WC0(λ, T
′) is the worst-case loss of a standard prediction market maker with parameter λ
and T ′ participants,NTL(λ, T ′) is the worst-case noise trader loss, and T ′c is the revenue from T ′
transaction fees of size c each.
The worst-case loss of a standard prediction market maker is well-known; see e.g. [2]. By our
normalization and definition of price sensitivity, we thus haveWC0(λ, T
′) ≤ B1λ .
To bound the noise trader lossNTL(λ, T ′), we will consider each bundle zt purchased by the noise
trader. The idea is to bound the difference in price between the purchase and sale of zt. For analysis,
we suppose that at each t, the noise trader first sells any previous bundles (e.g. at t = 4, first selling
z3 and then selling z2), and then purchases zt.
Now let b(t) be the largest power of 2 that divides t. Let qtbuy and q
t
sell be the market state just before
the noise trader purchases zt and just after she sells zt, respectively.
Claim 1. For each t, exactly b(t) traders arrive between the purchase and the sale of bundle zt;
furthermore, qtsell − qtbuy is exactly equal to the sum of these participants’ trades.
For example, suppose t is odd. Then only one participant arrives between the purchase and sale of
zt. Furthermore, zt is the last bundle purchased by the noise trader at time t and is the first sold at
time t+ 1, so the difference in market state is exactly zt plus that participant’s trade.
Claim 2. If the noise trader purchases and later sells zt, then her net loss in expectation over zt
(but for any trader behavior in response to zt), is at most λb(t)K whereK = E ‖zt‖2.
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We now sum over all bundles zt purchased by the noise trader, i.e. at time steps 1, . . . , T ′. Recall
that the noise trader sells back every bundle zt she purchases. Thus, her total payoff is the sum
over t of the difference in price at which she buys zt and price at which she sells it. For each
j = 0, . . . , logT ′ − 1, there are 2j different steps t with b(t) = T ′/2j+1. The total loss is thus,
NTL(λ, T ′) ≤
log T ′−1∑
j=0
2j
T ′
2j+1
λK =
T ′ logT ′
2
λK . (3)
Note that if the noise trader has some noise bundles left over after the final participant, we suppose
she immediately sells all remaining bundles back to the market maker in reverse order of purchase.
Putting eq. (3) together with the above bound onWC0 gives
WC(λ, T ′) ≤WC0(λ, T ′) + T ′ logT ′λK − T ′c ≤ B1
λ
+ T ′ (K logT ′λ− c) , (4)
which is in turn at most B1/λ if we choose λ and the transaction fee c such that c ≥ K logTλ. In
other words, we take λ ≤ c/K logT .
Finally, we can bound K = E ‖zt‖2 from Claim 2 as follows: for each t, the components of the
d-dimensional vector zt are each independent Lap(b) variables with b = 2⌈logT ⌉/ǫ. By concavity
of
√·, we have
K = E
√√√√ d∑
i=1
zt(i)2 ≤
√∑
i
E zt(i)2 =
√
dVar(Lap(b)) =
√
2db2 = 2
√
2d
⌈logT ⌉
ǫ
.
Therefore, it suffices to pick
λ ≤ c ǫ
2
√
2d⌈logT ⌉ logT .
For c = α, this is in fact accomplished by the private, accurate market choosing λ ≤ λ∗ from
eq. eq:lambda-star.
Limitations of this result. Unfortunately, Theorem 2 does not completely solve our problem: the
other way that privacy impacts the market’s loss is by lowering the necessary price sensitivity to
λ∗ ≈ 1(log T )2 as mentioned above, leading to a worst-case loss growing with T . It does not seem
possible to address this via a larger transaction fee without giving up incentive to participate: traders
participate as long as their expected profit exceeds the fee, and collectively Ω(1/λ) of them can
arrive making consistent trades all moving the prices in the same (correct) direction, so the total
payout will still be Ω(1/λ).
4 Constant Budget via Adaptive Market Size
In this section, we achieve our original goal by constructing an adaptively-growingpredictionmarket
in which each stage, if completed, subsidizes the initial portion of the next.
The market design is the following, with each T (k) to be chosen later. We run the transaction-fee pri-
vate market above with T = T (1), transaction fee α, and price sensitivity λ(1) = λ∗(T (1), α/2, γ/2)
from eq. (1). When (and if) T (1) participants have arrived, we create a new market whose initial
state is such that its prices match the final (noisy) prices of the previous one. We set T (2) and price
sensitivity λ(2) = λ∗(T (2), α/4, γ/4) for the new market. We repeat, halving α and γ at each stage
and increasing T in a manner to be specified shortly, until no more participants arrive.
Theorem 3. For any α, γ, ǫ, the adaptive market satisfies ǫ-differential privacy, 2α-incentive to
trade, (α, γ)-accuracy, and a designer budget bound of
B ≤ B1 72
√
2d
α ǫ
(
ln
4608B1
√
2d2
γα2ǫ
)2
,
where B1 is the budget bound of the underlying unscaled cost function C1.
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Proof idea. We set T (1) = Θ
(B1d ln(B1d/γαǫ)2
α2 ǫ
)
, and T (k) = 4T (k−1) thereafter. The key will
be the following observation. The total “informational” profit available to the traders (by correcting
the initial market prices) is bounded by O(1/λ), so if each trader expects to profit more than the
transaction fee c, then only O(1/λc) traders can all arrive and simultaneously profit. Indeed, if
all T participants arrive, then the total profit from transaction fees is Θ(T ) while the worst-case loss
from the market is O
(
(log T )2
)
.
We can leverage this observation to achieve a bounded worst-case loss with an “adaptive-liquidity”
approach, similar in spirit to Abernethy et al. [5] but more technically similar to the doubling trick
in online learning. Begin by setting λ(1) on the order of 1/(logT (1))2 = Θ(1), and run a private
market for T (1) participants. If fewer than T (1) participants show up, the worst-case loss is order
1/λ(1), a constant. If all T (1) participants arrive, then (for the right choice of constants) the market
has actually turned a profit Ω(T (1)) from the transaction fees. Now set up a private market for
T (2) = 4T (1) traders with λ(2) on the order of 1/(logT (2))2. If fewer than T (2) participants arrive,
the worst-case loss is order 1/λ(2). However, we will have chosen T (2) such that this loss is smaller
than the Ω(T (1)) profit from the previous market. Hence, the total worst-case loss remains bounded
by a constant.
If all T (2) participants arrive, then again this market has turned a profit, which can be used to
completely offset the worst-case loss of the next market, and so on. Some complications arise, as to
achieve (α, γ)-precision, we must set α(1), γ(1), α(2), γ(2), . . . as a convergent series summing to α
and γ; and we must show that all of these scalings are possible in such a way that the transaction
fees cover the cost of the next iteration. (An interesting direction for future work would be to replace
the iterative approach here with the continuous liquidity adaptation of [5].)
More specifically, we prove that the loss in any round k that is not completed (not all participants
arrive) is at most α16T
(k); moreover, the profit in any round k that is completed is at least α2 T
(k).
Of course, only one round is not completed: the final round k. If k = 1, then the financial loss is
bounded by 1
λ(1)
, a constant depending only on α, γ, ǫ. Otherwise, the total loss is the sum of the
losses across rounds, but the mechanism makes a profit in every round but k. Moreover, the loss in
round k is at most α2 T
(k) = α8 T
(k−1), which is at most half of the profit in round k− 1. So if k ≥ 2,
the mechanism actually turns a net profit.
While this result may seem paradoxical, note that the basic phenomenon appears in a classical (non-
private) prediction market with a transaction fee, although to our knowledge this observation has
not yet appeared in the literature. Specifically, a classical prediction market with budget bound B1,
trades of size 1, and a small transaction fee α, will still have an α-incentive to participate, and the
worst case loss will still beΘ(B1); this loss, however, can be extracted by as few asΘ(1) participants.
Any additional participants must be in a sense disagreeing about the correct prices; their transaction
fees go toward market maker profit, but they do not contribute further to worst-case loss.
5 Kernels, Buying Data, Online Learning
While preserving privacy in prediction markets is well-motivated in the classical prediction mar-
ket setting, it is arguably even more important in a setting where machine-learning hypotheses are
learned from private personal data. Waggoner et al. [15] develop mechanisms for such a setting
based on prediction markets, and further show how to preserve differential privacy of the partici-
pants. Yet their mechanisms are not practical in the sense that the financial loss of the mechanism
could grow without bound. In this section, we sketch how our bounded-financial-loss market can
also be extended to this setting. This yields a mechanism for purchasing data for machine learning
that satisfies ǫ-differential privacy, α-precision and incentive to participate, and bounded designer
budget.
To develop a mechanism which could be said to “purchase data” from participants, Waggoner et
al. [15] extend the classical setting in two ways. The first is to make the market conditional, where
we let Z = X × Y , and have independent markets Cx : Rd → R for each x. Trades in each market
take the form qx ∈ Rd, which pay out qx · φ(y) upon outcome (x′, y) if x = x′, and zero if x 6= x′.
Importantly, upon outcome (x, y), only the costs associated to trades in the Cx market are tallied.
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The second is to change the bidding language using a kernel, a positive semidefinite function k :
Z × Z → R. Here we think of contracts as functions f : Z → R in the reproducing kernel Hilbert
space (RKHS) F given by k, with basis {fz(·) = k(z, ·) : z ∈ Z}. For example, we recover the
conditional market setting with independent markets with the kernel k((x, y), (x′, y′)) = 1{x =
x′}φ(y) · φ(y′). The RKHS structure is natural here because a basis contract fz pays off at each z′
according to the “covariance” structure of the kernel, i.e. the payoff of contract fz when z
′ occurs
equals fz(z
′) = k(z, z′). For example, when Y = {−1, 1} one recovers radial basis classification
using k((x, y), (x′, y′)) = yy′e−(x−x
′)2 .
These two modifications to classical prediction markets, given as Mechanism 2 in [15], have clear
advantages as a mechanism to “buy data”. One may imagine that each agent, arriving at time t ∈
{1, . . . , T }, holds a data point (xt, yt) ∈ Z = X × Y . A natural purchase for this agent would be a
basis contract f(xt,yt), as this corresponds to a payoff that is highest when the test data point actually
equals (xt, yt) and decreases with distance as measured by the kernel structure.
The importance of privacy now becomes even more apparent, as the data point (xt, yt) could be
information sensitive to trader t. Fortunately, we can extend our main results to this setting. To
demonstrate the idea, we give a sketch of the result and proof below.
Theorem 4 (Informal). Let Z = X × Y where X is a compact subset of a finite-dimensional real
vector space and Y is finite, and let positive semidefinite kernel k : Z × Z → R be given. For
any choices of accuracy parameters α, γ, privacy parameters ǫ, δ, trade size ∆, and query limit
Q, the kernel adaptive market satisfies (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy, (α, γ)-precision, 2α-incentive to
participate, and a bounded designer budget.
Proof Sketch. The precision property, i.e. that prices are approximately accurate despite privacy-
preserving noise, follows from [15, Theorem 2], and the technique in Theorem 3 to combine the
accuracy and privacy of multiple epochs. The incentive to trade property is essentially unchanged,
as a participants’ profit is still the improvement in expected Bregman divergence, which exceeds the
transaction fee unless prices are already accurate. It thus remains only to show a bounded designer
budget, which is slightly more involved. Briefly, Claim 1 goes through unchanged, and Claim 2
holds as written where now C becomes Cx and z
t becomes zt(x) = f t(x, ·), i.e., the trade at time t
restricted to the Cx market alone.
The remainder of Lemma 1 now proceeds with one modification regarding the constantK . In eq. (3),
the expression for the noise trader loss becomes NTL(λ, T ′) = E
[
supx∈X
∑T ′
t=1 λαt‖zt(x)‖2
]
,
where the αt are simply coefficients to keep track of how many trades occurred between the buy and
sell of noice trade t. We can proceed as follows:
NTL(λ, T ′) ≤ E

 sup
x1,...,xT ′∈X
T ′∑
t=1
λαt‖zt(xt)‖2

 = λ T ′∑
t=1
αt E
[
sup
x∈X
‖zt(x)‖2
]
= λ
T ′∑
t=1
αtK ,
whereK is simply the constant E [supx∈X ‖zt(x)‖2] where the expectation is taken over the Gaus-
sian process generating the noise. It is well-known that the expected maximum of a Gaussian
process is bounded [14], and thus boundedness of K follows from the fact that Y is finite. Thus,
continuing from eq. (3) we obtain NTL(λ, T ′) ≤ T ′ log T ′2 λK as before, with this newK . Finally,
the proof of Theorem 3 now goes through, as it only treats the mechanism from Theorem 2 as a
black box.
We close by noting the similarity between the kernel adaptive market mechanism and tradi-
tional learning algorithms, as alluded to in the introduction. As observed by Abernethy, et
al. [2], the market price update rule for classical prediction markets resembles Follow-the-
Regularized-Leader (FTRL); specifically, the price update at time t is given by pt = ∇C(qt) =
argmaxw∈∆(Y)〈w,
∑
s≤t dq
s〉 − R(w), where dqs is the trade at time s, and R = C∗ is the convex
conjugate of C.
In our RKHS setting, we can see the same relationship. For concreteness, let Cx(q) =
1
λC(λq)
for all x ∈ X , and let R : ∆(Y) → R be the conjugate of C. Suppose further that each agent t
purchases a basis contract df t = fxt,yt , where we take a classification kernel k
′((x, y), (x′, y′)) =
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k(x, x′)1{y = y′}. Letting dqt(x) = df t(x, ·) ∈ RY , the market price at time t is given by,
ptx = argmax
w∈∆(Y)
〈
w,
∑
s≤t
dqs(x)
〉
− 1
λ
R(w)
= argmax
w∈∆(Y)
〈
w,
∑
s≤t
k((xs, ys), (x, ·))
〉
− 1
λ
R(w)
= argmax
w∈∆(Y)
〈
w,
∑
s≤t
k(xs, x)1ys
〉
− 1
λ
R(w) ,
where 1y is an indicator vector. Thus, the market price update follows a natural kernel-weighted
FTRL algorithm, where the learning rate λ is the price sensitivity of the market.
6 Summary and Future Directions
Motivated by the problem of purchasing data, we gave the first bounded-budget prediction mar-
ket mechanism that achieves privacy, incentive alignment, and precision (low impact of privacy-
preserving noise the predictions). To achieve bounded budget, we first introduced and analyzed a
transaction fee, achieving a slowly-growing O((log T )2) budget bound, thus eliminating the arbi-
trage opportunities underlying previous impossibility results. Then, observing that this budget still
grows in the number of participants T , we further extended these ideas to design an adaptively-
growing market, which does achieve bounded budget along with privacy, incentive, and precision
guarantees.
We see several exciting directions for future work. An extension of Theorem 4 where Y need not
be finite should be possible via a suitable generalization of Claim 2. Another important direction
is to establish privacy for parameterized settings as introduced by Waggoner, et al. [15], where in-
stead of kernels, market participants update the (finite-dimensional) parameters directly as in linear
regression. Finally, we would like a deeper understanding of the learning–market connection in non-
parametric kernel settings, which could lead to practical improvements for design and deployment.
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A Private (Unbounded-Loss) Markets
In this section, we review the private prediction market construction of Waggoner et al. [15]. We
include proofs for completeness and clarity, as we focus on classic, complete cost-function based
markets here whereas that paper focused on “kernel markets” which required additional formalism.
Our adaptive market will rely on this market construction and results.
Approach and notation. In a private market, the designer chooses an initial “true” market state
q0 (for convenience, we will assume q0 = 0) and announces a “published” market state qˆ0 = 0.
When participant t = 1, . . . , T arrives and requests trade dqt, the market maker updates the true
market state qt = qt−1 + dqt, but does not reveal the true state to anyone. Instead, the market
maker announces the published market state qˆt, which is some randomized function of all trades
and published market states so far. We assume that ‖dqt‖ ≤ 1 according to some norm ‖ · ‖, that is,
each participant can buy or sell at most one “total” share.4 Let ‖ · ‖∗ denote the dual norm to ‖ · ‖.
Differential privacy. The market mechanism can be viewed as a randomized function M that
takes as input a list of trades ~dq = dq1, . . . , dqT and outputs a list of published market states
qˆ0, . . . , qˆT . We will call it (ǫ, δ)-differentially private if changing a single participant’s trade does
not change the distribution on outputs much: if for all ~dq and ~dq′ differing only in one entry, and for
all (measurable) sets of possible outputs S,
Pr
[
M
(
~dq
)
∈ S
]
≤ eǫ Pr
[
M
(
~dq
′) ∈ S] + δ.
The mechanism is ǫ-differential private if it is (ǫ, 0)-d.p. It is reasonable to treat ǫ as a constant
whose size controls the privacy guarantee, such as ǫ = 0.01. Meanwhile, δ is normally preferred to
be vanishingly small or 0, as a mechanism can leak the private information of all individuals with δ
probability and still be (ǫ, δ)-differentially private.
To be careful, we note that the market’s “full output” also includes that it sends each participant
their payoff. However, this payoff is a function only of the public noisy market states and of that
participant’s trade. The payoff is assumed to be sent privately and separately, unobservable by
any other party. By the post-processing property of differential privacy, a trader’s (ǫ, δ)-privacy
guarantee continues to hold regardless of how the published market states are combined with any
side information, even including the full list of all other participant’s trades. (This can be formalized
using the notion of joint differential privacy, but for simplicity we will not do so.)
Tool 1: generalized Laplace noise. Imagine that the market could first collect all T trades simul-
taneously, then sum them and publish some qˆT , a noisy version of the market state qT =
∑T
t=1 dq
t.
In this scenario, there is only one output qˆT instead of a whole list of outputs qˆ1, . . . . The standard,
simplest solution to protecting privacy would be to take the true sum qT and add noise from a
generalization of the Laplace distribution. The real-valued Lap(b) random variable has probability
density x 7→ 12be−|x|/b. In Rd, given a norm ‖ · ‖, we define the generalized Lapd(b) distribution
to have probability density proportional to e‖x‖/b. In this case, releasing qˆ = q + Lapd(1/ǫ) is
ǫ-differentially private: Given q, q′ with ‖q − q′‖ ≤ 1, the ratio of probability densities at any qˆ is
eǫ‖q−qˆ‖/eǫ‖q
′−qˆ‖ ≤ eǫ‖q−q′‖ ≤ eǫ. (When the norm is L1, this corresponds to independent scalar
Lap(1/ǫ) noise on each of the d coordinates.) Note that it also satisfies a good accuracy guarantee,
as the amount of noise required does not scale with T ; so with enough participants, this mechanism
becomes a very accurate indication of the “average” trade while still preserving privacy.
Tool 2: continual observation technique. Unfortunately, the above solution is not sufficient be-
cause our market must publish a market state at each time step. One naive approach is to apply the
above solution independently at each time step, i.e. produce each qˆt = qt + zt where zt contains
independent Laplace noise. The problem is that each step reveals more information about a trade,
for instance, dq1 participates in T separate publications. To continue preserving privacy, each zt
must have a much larger variance, which makes the published market states very inaccurate.
4One could also modify our approach to allow arbitrarily large trades, but this would also require adding
proportionally large noise in order to continue to preserve privacy.
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Figure 1: Picturing the continual observation technique for preserving privacy [7, 10]. Each dqt is a trade.
The true market state at t is qt =
∑t
j=1 dq
j and the goal is to release a noisy version qˆt Each arrow originates
at t, points backwards to s(t), and is labeled with independent Laplace noise vector zt. Now qˆt = qt + zt +
zs(t) + zs(s(t)) + · · · . In other words, the noise added at t is a sum of noises obtained by following the arrows
all the way back to 0. There are two key properties: Each t has only log T arrows passing above it, and each
path backwards takes only log T jumps.
A second naive approach is to add noise to each dqt just once, producing dˆq
t
= dqt + zt. Then set
qˆt =
∑t
s=1 dˆq
t
. The benefit to this approach is that it can re-use the noisy zt variables across time
steps, rather than re-drawing new noise each time. The problem is that, while each zt is small in
magnitude, there are many of them; for example, the final qˆT contains T pieces of noise, which add
up to a very inaccurate estimate of the true market state. This contrasts with the first naive approach,
in which each publication only includes one piece of noise, but that piece of noise is very large.
The idea of the “continual observation” technique, pioneered by Dwork et al. [10] and Chan et al.
[7], is to strike a balance between these extremes by re-using noise a limited number of times while
also keeping each piece of noise small. Roughly, each publication qˆt will include a logarithmic (in
t) number of pieces of noise, each of which is only “logarithmically large”.
Definition 5. We define the private market mechanism for observation Z ∈ Z and securities φ :
Z → Rd using a cost functionC with parameter λ. At each time t participant t arrives and proposes
trade dqt with ‖dqt‖ ≤ 1, unobservable to all others. At most T participants may arrive. Let
qt =
∑t
j=1 dq
j . Let zt = 0 and for all t ≥ 1, let zt ∼ Lapd(2⌈logT ⌉/ǫ). At each time t, the
mechanism publishes market state
qˆt := qt + zt + zs(t) + zs(s(t)) + · · ·+ z0,
where s(t) is defined by writing the integer t in binary, then flipping the rightmost “one” bit to zero.
Participant t is charged C(qˆt + dqt) − C (ˆ(q)t), unobservable to all others. When outcome Z is
observed, she is paid dqt · φ(Z), unobservable to all others.
We note that s(0) = 0 and s(t) < t for all t > 0. A convenient notation is to let
qˆs(t):t :=

 t∑
j=s(t)+1
dqj

 + zt.
Then we can define the mechanism recursively as
qˆt = qt + zt + zs(t) + zs(s(t)) + · · ·+ z0
= qˆs(t):t + qˆs(t).
Remark. Notice that λ has no impact on the construction of the market, in particular does not
affect the amount of noise to add. Intuitively, this is because the market is defined entirely in “share
space”, while price sensitivity relates shares to prices. We will not need to discuss λ until we discuss
accuracy of the prices, which is irrelevant to the proof of privacy.
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Theorem 5 (Privacy). Assuming that all trades satisfy ‖dqt‖ ≤ 1 (under the same norm as used for
the generalized Laplace distribution), the private mechanism is ǫ-differentially private in the trades
dq1, . . . , dqT with respect to the output qˆ1, . . . , qˆT .
Proof. We emphasize that this proof does not contain new ideas beyond the original continual ob-
servation technique, but merely adapts them to this setting.
We will imagine that the market publishes every partial sum it uses, i.e. qˆs(t):t for all time steps
t. The actual published values qˆt are functions of these outputs, so by the post-processing property
of differential privacy [9], it suffices to show that publishing each of these partial sums would be
ǫ-differentially private.
The idea is to treat each publication of the form qˆs(t):t as a separate mechanism, which has (claim
1) a guarantee of (ǫ/⌈logT ⌉)-differential privacy. We then show (claim 2) that any one trade dqt
participates in at most ⌈logT ⌉ of these mechanisms. These two claims imply the result because,
by the composition property of differential privacy [9], each trade is therefore guaranteed ⌈logT ⌉ ·
(ǫ/⌈logT ⌉) = ǫ-differential privacy.
First, we claim that each publication qˆs(t):t preserves ǫ/⌈logT ⌉ differential privacy of each trade
dqt
′
that participates, i.e. with s(t) < t′ ≤ t. This follows from the definition of qˆs(t):t because,
since ‖dqt′‖ ≤ 1, an arbitrary change in dqt′ changes norm of the partial sum of trades by at most 2,
and zt is a draw from the generalized Lapd(2⌈logT ⌉/ǫ) distribution with respect to the same norm.
Second, we claim that each trade dqt
′
participates in at most ⌈logT ⌉ different partial sums qˆs(t):t.
To show this, we only need to count the time steps t where s(t) < t′ ≤ t, in other words, integers
t ≥ t′ where zeroing the rightmost “one” bit gives a number less than t′.
Without loss of generality, the the binary expansion of t is bmbm−1 . . . bj10 . . .0 for somem, j and
then s(t) has expansion bmbm−1 . . . bj00 . . . 0. Hence the condition s(t) < t′ ≤ t implies that the
binary expansion of t matches that of t′ from bitsm to j, then has a one at bit j − 1, and has zeroes
at all lower-order bits. Since m is fixed for t′, this can only happen once for each j, or at most m
total times; andm ≤ ⌈logT ⌉ because t′ ≤ T .
Lemma 2 (Accuracy of share vector). In the private mechanism with L1 norm, d securities, and T
time steps, we have with probability 1− γ,
max
t
‖qt − qˆt‖1 ≤ 4
√
2d log⌈T ⌉
ǫ
ln
(
2Td
γ
)
.
Proof. For each t, each coordinate i of qt − qˆt is the sum of at most ⌈logT ⌉ independent variables
distributed Lap(2⌈logT ⌉/ǫ). We will choose β such that each coordinate’s absolute value exceeds
β with probability γTd ; there are d coordinates per time step and T time steps, so a union bound
gives the result.
Choose β such that, if Y is the sum of k = ⌈logT ⌉ independent Lap(b) variables with b =
2⌈logT ⌉/ǫ) variables, then
Pr[|Y | > β] = γ′.
A concentration bound for the sum of k independentLap(b) variables, Corollary 12.3 of Dwork and
Roth [9]5 gives
β ≤ 2
√
2b ln
2
γ′
.
Now choose γ′ = γTd . To recap, each |qt(i)− qˆt(i)| ≤ β except with probability γ′ = γTd , hence by
a union bound this holds for all t, i except with probability γ, hence ‖qt − qˆt‖1 ≤ dβ except with
probability γ.
As mentioned above, the previous results (Theorem 5 and Lemma 2) do not depend on λ at all,
because they do not mention the prices. We now ask what a “reasonable” choice of λ can be so that
the prices are interpretable as predictions, i.e. the prices are “accurate”.
5In the parameters of that Corollary, we choose ν = b
√
ln(2/γ′) as we will have ln(2/γ′) > k.
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Theorem 6 (Accuracy of prices). In the private mechanism, let pt = ∇C(qt) and let pˆt = ∇C(qˆt).
Then to satisfy ‖pt − pˆt‖1 ≤ α for all t, except with probability γ, it suffices for the price sensitivity
to be
λ∗ =
α ǫ
4
√
2d⌈logT ⌉ ln(2Td/γ) .
Proof. By definition of λ, we have
‖pt − pˆt‖1 ≤ λ‖qt − qˆt‖1
≤ λ4
√
2d⌈logT ⌉
ǫ
ln
(
2Td
γ
)
(5)
for all t except with probability γ, by Lemma 2. We now just choose λ so that (5) ≤ α.
B Slowly-Growing Budget
We prove the incentive and budget claims in separate lemmas.
Lemma 3 (Incentive to trade). In the private market with transaction fee α, a participant at time t
having belief p with ‖p− pˆt‖∞ ≥ 2α can make a strictly positive expected profit by participating.
Proof. Ignoring the transaction fee, the expected profit from purchasing dq (recall ‖dq‖1 ≤ 1) is
profit = 〈dq, p〉+ C(qˆt)− C(qˆt + dq).
Because C is convex,C(qˆt)− C(qˆt + dq) ≥ 〈∇C(qˆt + dq),−dq〉. So
profit ≥ 〈dq, p−∇C(qˆt + dq)〉
= 〈dq, p− pˆt〉 − 〈dq,∇C(qˆt + dq)− pˆt〉.
By Hölder’s inequality and the definition of price sensitivity,
〈dq,∇C(qˆt + dq)− pˆt〉 ≤ ‖dq‖∞‖∇C(qˆ + dq)− pˆ‖1
≤ ‖dq‖∞λ‖dq‖1
≤ λ.
So we have
max profit ≥ max
dq:‖dq‖1≤1
〈dq, p− pˆt〉 − λ
= ‖p− pˆ‖∞ − λ
≥ 2α− λ
> α
as λ < α by construction. Because there exists a trade with expected profit strictly above α, the
trader has an incentive to pay the α transaction fee and participate.
Claim 3 (Claim 1). For each t, exactly b(t) traders arrive between the purchase and the sale of
bundle zt; furthermore, qtsell − qtbuy is exactly equal to the sum of these participants’ trades.
Proof. Note that if we write t in binary, it has a one in the bit position log b(t), followed by zeros.
By definition of the algorithm, zt is sold at the next time t′ > t where the bit log b(t) is flipped to
zero. So we have t′ − t = b(t), so b(t) traders have arrived.
Now we want to show that qtsell− qtbuy is the sum of their trades, i.e. that every noise trade bundle zt
′
held by the trader before buying zt is still held at the moment of selling zt, and no other noise trade
bundles are held at that time.
Consider all of the noise bundles that were already held at time t (after selling the appropriate
bundles at that time, but before purchasing zt). By definition of the algorithm, these were purchased
at times s with b(s) > b(t), so by the above discussion, they are not sold until times t′ where the
bits in positions log b(s) are flipped to zero, which cannot happen until after bit log b(t) is flipped
and zt is sold. Meanwhile, every bundle purchased after zt is sold by, at the latest, the same time
that zt is sold, as they correspond to lower-order bits; and any sold at the same time as zt are sold
first because they were purchased later.
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Claim 4 (Claim 2). If the noise trader purchases and later sells zt, then her net loss in expectation
over zt (but for any trader behavior in response to zt), is at most λb(t)K whereK = E ‖zt‖2.
Proof. Given the noise trader’s bundle drawn is zt, her loss is:
C(qtbuy + z
t)− C(qtbuy) + C(qtsell)− C(qtsell + zt).
The first pair of terms represents the payment made to purchase zt (moving the market state from
qtbuy); the second pair represents the payment to sell z
t (moving the state to qtsell). Claim 3 implies
that ‖qtbuy − qtsell‖1 ≤ b(t), as each trader can buy or sell at most 1 unit of shares. Therefore, the net
loss on bundle zt is at most
E
zt
max
q,q′:‖q−q′‖1≤b(t)
C(q + zt)− C(q) + C(q′)− C(q′ + zt)
Now, we have
C(q + zt)− C(q) =
∫ 1
x=0
∇C(q + xzt) · ztdx,
C(q + r + zt)− C(q + r) =
∫ 1
x=0
∇C(q + r + xzt) · ztdx.
So the difference is ∫ 1
x=0
〈∇C(q + xzt)−∇C(q + r + xzt) , zt〉 dx
≤
∫ 1
x=0
λ‖r‖2‖zt‖2dx
= λ‖r‖2‖zt‖2
by definition of price sensitivity λ. We also have ‖r‖2 ≤ ‖r‖1 ≤ b(t). This bound holds for
each outcome of zt and any behavior of the participants, so we conclude the lemma statement, that
expected loss is bounded by λb(t)E ‖zt‖2.
C Constant Budget Bound
Lemma 4. Let A,D be constants at least 1 with AD ≥ 5. Then for all T ≥ 9A (ln(AD))2, we
have T ≥ A (ln(TD))2.
Proof. Let T ∗ = 9A (ln(AD))2. First, we prove the inequality for T ∗:
T ∗ = 9A (ln(AD))2
= A (3 ln(AD))2
= A
(
ln(AD(AD)2)
)2
.
Now for all AD ≥ 5, we have AD ≥ 3 ln(AD), so
T ∗ ≥ A (ln (9AD(ln(AD))2))2
= A (ln(T ∗D))2 ,
as desired. Now we wish to extend this to all T ≥ T ∗. Compare the derivative of the left side,
dT
dT = 1, with that of the right side:
d
dT
(
A (ln(TD))
2
)
=
2A ln(TD)
T
≤ 2
ln(TD)
≤ 1
at T = T ∗. Now if the inequality holds for all T ′ ∈ [T ∗, T ), then it holds for T as the left side only
increases more quickly than the right. So by transfinite induction, it holds for all T ≥ T ∗.
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Proof of Theorem 3. Fix the parameters ǫ and d throughout. Let λ∗(T, α, γ) be the price sensitivity
parameter as a function of these variables given in Theorem 6.
ǫ-differential privacy of the market follows by the post-processing property of differential privacy [9]
because each stage k is differentially private for the participants who arrive in that stage. All infor-
mation released after stage k depends on these participants only through the noisy market state at
the end of stage k, which is ǫ-d.p.
To show the incentive guarantee, note that the transaction fee is always fixed at α, so the incentive
proof of Theorem 2 goes through immediately.
To show the accuracy guarantee, note the the prices up to T (1) arrivals satisfy an α/2 guarantee;
therefore the starting prices of the new market are within α/2 of what they would be without added
noise. The prices up to T (2) additional arrivals are within α/2 + α/4 of what they would have been
(since they begin within α/2 and are designed to stay within α/4 of this shifted goal); and so on,
telescoping to at most α. Similarly, the chance of failure of any of these guarantees, by a union
bound, is at most γ/2 + γ/4 + · · · ≤ γ.
Now we must show bounded worst-case loss, and how to set T (k). We will choose T (1) to be a
constant and each T (k) = 4T (k−1).
We will claim two things:
1. In the final stage k where not all participants arrive, the market maker’s loss is at most
α
16T
(k).
2. In each stage k that is completed (all T (k) participants arrive), the market maker’s profit
from that stage is at least α2 T
(k).
These together prove bounded worst-case loss: If at least one stage is completed, the total profit is
in fact positive: it is positive from all but the last stage, whose loss is at most α16T
(k) ≤ α4 T (k−1)
which is smaller than the profit made in stage k− 1. If no stages are completed, i.e. fewer than T (1)
participants arrive, then expected worst-case loss is bounded by B
′
λ(1)
. This gives a budget bound of
B′
λ(1)
, which will be computed below.
Proof of (1). First, we must prove that the worst-case loss in stage 1 is at most α16T
(1). In doing
so, we will explicitly compute a sufficient T (1) and this worst-case loss. Then, we must show the
same fact for all other stages.
The worst-case loss in stage 1, by Theorem 2, is
B =
B′
λ(1)
= B′
8
√
2d⌈logT (1)⌉ ln (4T (1)d/γ)
α ǫ
≤ B′ 8
√
2d
(
ln
(
4T (1)d/γ
))2
α ǫ
.
For convenience, set A′ = B′ 8
√
2d
αǫ and set D = 4d/γ. Then we have B ≤ A′
(
ln(T (1)D)
)2
; to
prove claim (1) for stage 1, we wish to pick T (1) such thatB ≤ α16T (1). SettingA = 16α A′, we need
to have A
(
ln(T (1)D)
)2 ≤ T (1). By Lemma 4, this holds for
T (1) = 9A (ln(AD))
2
= B′
1152
√
2d
(
ln 4608B
′
√
2d2
γα2ǫ
)2
α2 ǫ
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So for this choice of T (1), we have claim (1) for stage 1. We note the budget bound is B ≤ α16T (1).
Now we just show that T (k) increases faster than 1/λ(k). T (k) = 4T (k−1), but
B
λ(k)
=
4
√
2B2kd⌈logT (k)⌉ ln (2T (k)d2k/γ)
α ǫ
= 2
4
√
2B2k−1d⌈2 + logT (k−1)⌉ (ln(8) + ln (2T (k−1)d2k−1/γ))
α ǫ
≤ 4 1
λ(k−1)
for sufficiently large T (k−1), i.e. if T (1) is a sufficiently large constant. So B
λ(k)
grows more slowly
than T (k) and the inequality B
λ(k)
≤ α16T (k) continues to hold.
Proof of (2). Let us lower-bound the profit in stage k if completed. By Inequality 4 (from Theorem
2), that the market-maker profit if T ′ = T (k) participants arrive is
T (k)
(
c−Kλ(k) logT (k)
)
− B
λ(k)
= T (k)
(
α−
√
2d⌈logT (k)⌉ logT (k)
ǫ
(α/2k) ǫ
4
√
2d⌈logT (k)⌉ ln(2dT (k)2k/γ)
)
− B
λ(k)
= αT (k)
(
1− logT
(k)
4(2k)
√
d ln(2dT (k)2k/γ)
)
− B
λ(k)
.
Recall that B
λ(k)
≤ α16T (k). We want to conclude that the profit in stage k is at least α2 T (k), so we
just need to show that
1 − logT
(k)
4(2k)
√
d ln(2dT (k)2k/γ)
− 1
16
≥ 1
2
.
The fraction is decreasing in k, so it suffices to achieve this for k = 1, d = 1, and γ = 1, where we
have
logT (1)
8 ln(4T (1))
≤ 1
4
.
This suffices to prove Claim (2).
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